

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 04194 01 OF 02 271907Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----271936Z 089600 /47
P R 271622Z MAY 77
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3308
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 4194

EXDIS/SALT

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR EARLE
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF MAY 27, 1977

BEGIN TEXT

MR MINISTER:

I

TODAY I WILL DISCUSS ANOTHER OF OF THE ISSUES WHICH WE
BELIEVE CAN BE RESOLVED BY THE RENEWED EFFORTS OF THE
DELEGATIONS. TE SIDES HAVE AGREED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF
ARTICLE XVI THAT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ASSURANCE
OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT,
EACH PARTY SHALL USE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFI-
CATION AT ITS DISPOSAL IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH
GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE IS AN ARTICLE WHICH WILL REINFORCE
CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE SIDES BY SETTING FORTH CLEARLY
AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY THE OBLIGATIONS OF EACH SIDE WITH
RESPECT TO ENSURING THAT THIS VITAL FUNCTION CAN BE
PERFORMED. ONLY PARAGRAPH 3 OFARTICLE XVI, PERTAINING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 04194 01 OF 02 271907Z

TO DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT, REMAINS UNRESOLVED.

II

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT ITS PROPOSAL FOR
PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI CONTAINS THE BREADTH NECESSARY
TO ENSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE

PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. IT IS THE UNITED STATES POSITION THAT ALL MEASURES WHICH DELIBERATELY IMPEDE VERIFICATION, INCLUDING ANY SUCH MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING, SHOULD BE PROHIBITED. IT IS FURTHER THE UNITED STATES POSITION THAT MUTUAL CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE REINFORCED THROUGH A COMMITMENT BY EACH SIDE TO USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO AVOID MEASURES AND PRACTICES WHICH RESULT IN UNINTENTIONALLY IMPEDING VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI ON THE CONDITION OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREED STATEMENT. IN THE UNITED STATES VIEW, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE SIDES RECOGNIZE EXPLICITLY THE APPLICABILITY OF THE NON-CONCEALMENT OBLIGATION TO THE TESTING PHASE OF ARMS DEVELOPMENT. UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ARMS WHICH ARE TO BE LIMITED BY ONE OR MORE PROVISIONS AND ARMS WHICH ARE NOT TO BE SO LIMITED. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MIRVED MISSILES AND MISSILES WHICH ARE NOT MIRVED. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS TYPES OF MISSILES AND THEIR LAUNCHERS. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE THROW-WEIGHT AND THE LAUNCH-WEIGHT OF CERTAIN TYPES OF MISSILES. SUCH DETERMINATIONS, AS WELL AS OTHERS, ARE MADE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MANS DURING THE TESTING PHASE. IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THAT THE SIDES UNDERTAKE TO PROHIBIT ANY MEASURES, INCLUDING MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING, WHICH

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 04194 01 OF 02 271907Z

DELIBERATELY HINDER OR DELIBERATLY IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.

III

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI AND ITS PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT WOULD NARROW AND CONSTRAIN THE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT PROVISION. IN PARTICULAR, DESPITE THE RECOGNIZED IMPORTANCE OF THE TESTING PHASE TO THE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE, THE SOVIET POSITION WOULD EXEMPT CURRENT TESTING PRACTICES FROM CONSIDERATION AS DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES. THE OUTCOME WOULD BE TO SANCTION ALL TESTING PRACTICES NOW IN USE AND ANY WHICH MIGHT BE INTRODDED BEFORE THE DATE THE PROVISION BECOMES EFFECTIVE, EVEN THSE WHICH WOULD DELIBERATELY IMPEDE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT. ON MAY 13, 1977, WE REFERRED TO TWO INSTANCES OF CURRENT TESTING PRACTICES THE INTENT OF WHICH CAN ONLY BE TO CONCEAL,

TO SANCTION SUCH PRACTICES IN THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE A
STEP BACKWARD.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 04194 02 OF 02 271926Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----271932Z 090414 /41

P R 271622Z MAY 77
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3309
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 4194

EXDIS/SALT

WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE
PROHIBITION OF DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES TO THOSE
MEASURES WHICH ARE "SPECIAL." THE INSERTION OF THE WORD
"SPECIAL" IMPLIES THAT CERTAIN OTHER MEASURES WHICH ARE
NOT "SPECIAL" AND WHICH DELIBERATELY IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD BE PERMITTED.

IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING FROM PREVIOUS SOVIET STATEMENTS
THAT "PROVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING" IN THE SOVIET
DEFINITION OF DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WOULD APPLY
TO ALL OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. THEREFORE,
AS AN EXAMPLE, WE WOULD INTERPRET THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO
APPLY TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE II, THE DEFINITION OF
HEAVY ICBMS, EVEN THOUGH THAT PARAGRAPH DOES NOT EXPLICITLY
MENTION TESTING. IF IN FACT THE SOVIET DELEGATION AGREES
THAT THE PROHIBITION ON DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT APPLIES TO
ALL OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND THAT IT APPLIES
TO THE TESTING PHASE, THEN WE SUGGEST THAT THE WORDS
"MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING" MORE CLEARLY ESTABLISH
THAT OBLIGATION.

FURTHER, THE SOVIET POSITION THAT METHODS OF TRANSMITTING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 04194 02 OF 02 271926Z

TELEMETRIC INFORMATION DURING TESTING CANNMT BE DELIBERATE
CONCEALMENT MEASURES IS AGAIN AT VARIANCE WITH THE FACT
THAT DTERMINATIONS ESSENTIAL TO VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
ARE MADE DURING THE TESTING PHASE. TELEMETRY IS BUT ONE
PART OF THE OVERALL INFORMATION COLLECTED BY NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS AND SHOULD NOT BE EXEMPTED FROM THE
OBLIGATION.

IV

THEUNITED STATES BELIEVES IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
PRICNIPLE THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD AVOID UNINTENTTTIONAL
CONCEALMENT. THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT THE
SIDES APPLY THEIR BEST EFFORTS TOWARD THIS END. WE AR
UNCERTAIN AS TO THE REASON FOR SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO
DATE TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A COMMITMENT.

V

MR. MINISTER, ARTICLE XVI MUST PROVIDE A BASIS FOR
REINFORCING CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE SIDES - A CONFIDENCE
WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE NEW AGREEMENT. IT IS OUR BELIEF
THAT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL WOULD ACHIEVE THIS
OBJECTIVE.EARLE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, SPEECHES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 27-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977SALTT04194
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: DG ALTERED PER 77 GENEVA 4390
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770190-0626
Format: TEL
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t1977059/aaaaahkt.tel
Line Count: 197
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 3e6f179a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2629467
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AMBASSADOR EARLE'S STATEMENT OF MAY 27, 1977 (SALT TWO-1194)
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3e6f179a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009